A new BC Wildfire Service report has surfaced about the 2023 Shuswap firestorm that includes details about how the situation quickly became out of control soon after the backburn was ignited by a helicopter drip torch.
This online report, called the Adams Lake Facilitated Learning Analysis, was prepared as part of the follow-up to the joint WorkSafeBC and the B.C. Government Employeeѻýs Union investigation into the near-fatal entrapment of the Brazilian crew. It includes photos, videos, interviews and timelines to describe what happened and how staff reacted to the crisis.
Several factors resulted in what can now be verified as a disastrous decision to do an aerial ignition as a last ditch, ѻýhail Maryѻý effort to prevent the Adams East wildfire from advancing into North Shuswap communities. Two days prior to the ignition, the leadership changed as a BC team replaced the exiting Australians. After the fire blew up that night, there were mounting concerns that the anticipated advancing cold front would blow the fire into the community in two days, which was confirmed by computer modelling.
Consequently, a hasty decision was made to do the backburn using the Hydro right-of-way as the control line, even though as the report explains, ѻýviews were mixed,ѻý as one staffer ѻýexpressed concerns about the proximity of the cold front.ѻý The decision was finalized on the morning of the 17th despite the weather prediction that showed how winds were predicted to shift at 9:30 p.m. Evacuation planning was also discussed, including the complications due to the one way in and out road and the predicted congestion.
Even though the window to do the burn began at 2 p.m., the aerial ignition did not begin until 4:15 and it was completed by 4:55 p.m. The goal was to ѻýwiden a fuel free area to prevent aggressive fire growth.ѻý They soon realized there was a need to burn off the fuel between the powerline and the backburn, because the helicopter could not get close to the powerlines. Thus crews, who had never done hand torch burning before, had to be sent in without adequate training, without clear instructions, without adequate tools and with an inadequate amount of liquid fuel that had been poorly mixed.
The road was rough, which slowed the operation and soon the Brazilian crew was putting out spot fires. In the air, the helicopter coordinators observed the scene with ѻýdisbeliefѻý as there were significant risks given that night was closing in. Winds began to shift at 7:30 p.m. and at 8:08 p.m. the backburn blew across the powerline, forcing crews to make a hasty escape. Some trucks drove down the side road into Lee Creek and one nearly flipped over as it had to avoid a burning slash pile.
Due in part to the language barrier, the Brazilian crew went in the wrong direction and became trapped. They survived because they were parked on the right-of-way where there was little fuel, and the flames were minimal. Just prior to sunset, the helicopter coordinator observed the backburn spreading into both the Scotch Creek valley and into Meadow Creek. Later that night, a crew observed that the fire had spread across the Scotch Creek forest service road at the 5-kilometre mark, while another crew was in Meadow Creek observing the spread of the fire.
A debrief about the entrapment was the focus on the following morning and the team began to prepare for the cold front and the anticipated significant growth of both fires. It was not until 11:30 a.m. that preparations began for evacuation, but the order did not come until 2:15 p.m. for Scotch Creek and 4 p.m. for Celista, well after the fire was in those communities.
As the winds intensified on the afternoon of the Aug. 18, bedlam ensued because the Wildfire Service had to evacuate their camp, and residents were forced to defend their properties as the firestorm engulfed their communities.
Most of this report is focused on helping staff cope with the aftermath of the disaster and it avoids finding fault or making recommendations. The reportѻýs goal is to simply foster discussion and learning as if it was a therapy exercise for stressed out wildfire managers.
While it is the Forest Practices Board that is considering whether the decision to light the backburn was ѻýreasonable,ѻý this report points to another major, unaddressed concern. How could the Wildfire Service claim their burn was a success at the same time as they were having to deal with the escape of the burn that endangered their crews and was observed heading to our communities, given that their overall goal is public safety?